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Abstract
Development accounting shows that a signicant part of cross-country income dier-
ences is attributed to dierences in total factor productivity (TFP), but the sources of
TFP dierences are not well understood. This paper considers the role of international
trade to explain cross-country income dierences in TFP. By using a multi-country
Ricardian trade model, I distinguish trade costs and trade policy factors from a pure
technology factor in TFP. Under the baseline parameterization, my model shows that
conventional TFP measures overestimate fundamental productivity dierences by 30%.
I then show that trade costs signicantly inuence welfare: small European countries en-
joy 10{15% higher welfare through their proximity to larger and more productive neigh-
boring countries, while Oceanian and countries in southern Africa suer from 10{20%
lower welfare due to their remoteness. Trade policy also has impacts: taris decrease
welfare by 1{10%, while free-trade agreements increase welfare by 1{5%. These gains
from trade are considerably smaller if general equilibrium eects are not considered.
Keywords: Development accounting; Total factor productivity; Cross-country income
dierences; Ricardian trade model; Gains from trade; General equilibrium eects.
JEL Codes: E22, E23, F11, O40, O47.
1 Introduction
Development accounting shows that cross-country income dierences are explained by dier-
ences in the observable factors of capital and labor but also attributed to dierences in total
Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. Address: 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka
567-0047, Japan; Phone: +81-6-6879-8581; Email to: ishise@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp; I would appreciate comments
made by Takumi Naito, Ray Riezman, Katsuya Takii, and seminar/conference/workshop participants at
Hitotsubashi U.; Osaka U.; Kyoto Development Economics Workshop; Spring 2015 JEA meeting; Spring 2015
Midwest International Trade Meeting; Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations;
2015 Summer Workshop of Economic Theory. This work is supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number
26885043. All errors are mine.
1
factor productivity (TFP) (see, e.g., Caselli, 2005; Hsieh and Klenow, 2010). This decomposi-
tion leads us to an important question: what can best explain cross-country TFP dierences?
This paper considers the role of international trade to explain cross-country dierences in
TFP. By introducing a multi-country Ricardian international trade structure in the stan-
dard development accounting model, I show that conventional TFP measures overestimate
fundamental productivity dierences by 30%. I then show that trade plays an important
role in determining economic welfare. Small European countries enjoy 10{15% higher welfare
through their proximity to large, productive countries, while Oceanian and South African
countries suer from 10{20% lower welfare due to their remoteness. Moreover, average tar-
i rates and free-trade agreements change welfare by as much as 10% for some developing
countries.
My model combines the scheme of development accounting with Alvarez and Lucas's
(2007b) specication of Eaton and Kortum's (2002) multi-country Ricardian trade model.
I assume that technology dierence in the intermediate goods production sector is the fun-
damental source of the TFP dierences across countries.1 Countries internationally trade
intermediate goods to produce intermediate composite goods. The intermediate composite
goods are used to produce consumption goods, investment goods, and intermediate goods.
Through this chain of input-output, the aggregate output, and hence aggregate measured
TFP, of each country depends not only on its own technology but also that of the other
countries.
The autarky version of my model implies that standard development accounting is an
appropriate method to calculate the underlying technology parameter.2 The reason is that
in a model with intermediate inputs, TFP of the aggregate production function is a weighted
mean of the productivity of sectors (Hulten, 1978). In my model, intermediate goods are
the only source of productivity, and hence the aggregate TFP directly corresponds to the
fundamental technology parameter.
This simple correspondence between aggregate TFP and technology parameter does not
hold under equilibrium with international trade. Yet, I can calculate productivity parameters
for each country. I calibrate the model using data of 140 countries in 2005. Analogous to
development accounting, the model isolates productivity of countries from observed income of
countries. I then compare the productivity parameters obtained from standard development
accounting to the parameters derived from a model under open-economy. Under the baseline
parameterization, my model shows that the dierences in cross-country productivity required
to explain cross-country income dierence are 30% smaller than the corresponding values from
the standard development accounting exercise. The input-output chain mechanism amplies
small dierences in the underlying technology to large dierences in the aggregate measured
1Including variations in TFP in other sectors is technically possible. I do not include these additional
variations in order to elucidate the mechanism driven by trade.
2Waugh (2010) obtains the analogous expression in his model, but does not highlight the result in this
manner. See below for a brief discussion of how my paper diers from his.
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TFP, which echoes the closed-economy models of Jones (2011, 2013).
Next, I explore the roles of trade costs and trade policies in determining welfare of a
country, and nd that these trade barriers play important roles. The calculations are as
follows. First, I solve the equilibrium of the model under alternative (hypothetical) trade
barrier assumptions while xing baseline productivity parameters. Second, I calculate hypo-
thetical utility values for various scenarios. Finally, I compare the consumption-equivalent
welfare changes of two alternative scenarios, and measure the eects of various trade barriers
on the economic welfare of countries. The results show large gains from trade, some eects
of geography, and even smaller impacts from trade policy. The results also show that trade
gains quantitatively depend on whether consideration is given to general equilibrium eects
(through changes in wages of countries).
Average trade gains are large. Trade gains are especially large for small, developing
countries: for some countries, current welfare is more than four times the welfare under
autarky. By comparison, trade gains for large countries are much smaller. In addition, trade
gains with general equilibrium eects are generally larger than gains without these eects.
Total trade gains are decomposed into the roles of trade, geography (trade costs), and
trade policy. Trade itself plays the main role in determining the gains from trade, and other
factors also play some roles. Small European countries enjoy 10-15% higher welfare through
their proximity to large productive countries. These large European countries (e.g., Germany,
France, the UK themselves benet by being near one another and experience higher welfare
by approximately 10%. The negative impacts of geography are prevalent for Oceanian and
countries in southern Africa, which suer from 10{20% lower welfare due to their remoteness.
The largest negative impact, 22%, is (not surprisingly) observed for New Zealand. Trade
policies aect welfare, but less than trade cost does. Average tari rates and free-trade
agreements change income 5{10% for some developing countries. In general, trade policy has
minor eects on developed countries; tari rates are already close to zero, so a lower tari, or
removing taris through FTAs, does not drastically change welfare. However, the margin of
welfare gains through tari reduction is not small for some developing countries.
The paper is organized as follows. The rest of the introduction discusses how the paper
draws from and contributes to the literature. The next section presents the model. Section 3
explains data, calibration strategy, and the results. The nal section concludes.
1.1 Contributions to the literature
This paper combines two strands of literature and oers new insights on both of them: de-
velopment accounting, and application of Ricardian models a la Eaton and Kortum (2002).
Given the results of standard development accounting (Caselli, 2005; Hsieh and Klenow,
2010), researchers examine the sources of TFP dierences. For example, misallocation within
a country can be a source of a low aggregate TFP in poor countries (Restuccia and Rogerson,
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2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Input-output chain amplies a small dierence in TFP in
a sector to large aggregate TFP (Jones, 2011, 2013). Other than a few exceptions, these
studies basically depend on closed-economy analysis. Jones (2013) includes inputs from other
countries, but he does not explicitly construct a model of international trade. Gancia et al.
(2013) consider the role of international technology adoption by including international trade
of goods, but do not highlight the role of trade barriers. My paper complements studies of
development accounting by examining the role of international trade and trade barriers in
TFP measurement.
Compared with other applications of multi-country Ricardian models (Alvarez et al., 2013;
Alvarez and Lucas, 2007a,b; Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan, 2009; Mutreja et al., 2014a,b;
Waugh, 2010), my contribution is to bring the model into a relatively simple development
accounting framework. As previously noted, my paper builds on Alvarez and Lucas (2007b),
which is a direct extension of Alvarez and Lucas (2007a). Alvarez and Lucas (2007a) re-
specify the model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to be a full-edged general equilibrium model
in which labor is the only fundamental factor of production. They examine the impact of
trade costs and tari on income across countries, but do not consider the implication of
measured productivity across countries. Alvarez and Lucas (2007b) further include capital as
an additional production factor and analyze the transition dynamics of the model. However,
they do not examine steady-state implications of trade costs and welfare.
Many international trade papers analyze the welfare gains from trade and/or gains from
reducing trade costs/taris (see, e.g., Arkolakis et al., 2012), but not in terms of productivity.
An exception is Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009) who show a two-country version of TFP
decomposition in the spirit of Hulten (1978): in a rst order approximation, a change in the
country ?s aggregate TFP depends on changes in productivities of two-countries. However,
Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009) focus on business cycle properties of the Eaton and
Kortum (2002) model in a two-country framework. Alvarez et al. (2013) include diusion of
knowledge, but disregard the accounting. Arkolakis et al. (2012) provide a simple formula
that can assess quantitative gains from trade in several trade models, including Eaton and
Kortum's (2002).
Waugh (2010) and Mutreja et al. (2014a,b) use versions of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to
quantitatively examine cross-country income dierences. Waugh (2010) assumes that capi-
tal and labor are exogenously given, consumption and investment goods are produced by a
single nal good sector, and taris are not included. I assume that capital and labor are
endogenously determined, consumption and investment goods productions are distinguished,
and taris are included. Nevertheless, my model provides an extended decomposition of the
aggregate output as seen in Waugh (2010). Waugh (2010) then parameterizes the model
using observed trade, income and price data to quantitatively assess the impact of trade cost
reduction on the welfare. He focuses on the role of asymmetric trade costs between rich and
poor countries and analyzes the welfare eects of a hypothetical reduction in trade costs from
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current levels. His work serves to explicate implications of reducing trade costs. I instead use
income data to calibrate productivity parameters, which is parallel to standard development
accounting. Mutreja et al. (2014a,b) further extend the model of Waugh (2010) by incorpo-
rating capital goods trade, goods-direction-specic trade costs, two types of capital goods,
and international productivity dierences in various sectors. They calibrate the model using
many observable values and successfully replicate various other macro-values.
Contrary to Waugh (2010) and Mutreja et al. (2014a,b), I keep my model simple and
calibrate a minimal number of country specic parameters to highlight the mechanism un-
derlying the cross-country income dierences. Another benet of using a simple calibration
strategy is that I can include many countries, especially developing ones, in my quantitative
analysis.3 Including many developing countries gives richer insights into the role of trade bar-
riers on welfare. Note also that Waugh (2010) and Mutreja et al. (2014a,b) do not examine
the general equilibrium eects on welfare.
My paper complements Alvarez and Lucas (2007a,b), Waugh (2010) and Mutreja et al.
(2014a,b) by examining the role of technology, international trade and trade barriers for
welfare in a full-edged general equilibrium model with capital and labor. I also show the
quantitative signicance of general equilibrium eects in welfare analysis, which is not neces-
sarily highlighted by Alvarez and Lucas (2007a).
2 Model
The model is a discrete-time innite horizon model (t = 0; 1; :::) with no aggregate uncertainty.
The analysis will focus on the steady-state equilibrium, and variables without time subscripts
stand for the steady-state values.
2.1 Setup
The world consists of n countries, and each country is indexed by i; j = 1; :::; n. Each country
has Ni workers, which are exogenously given. In each country, a representative household
supplies labor, and consumes the nal consumption good ci. Households cannot move across
countries. A household in a country owns capital and lends it to rms in the country. I make
two assumptions: international nancial transactions are not possible, and trade is balanced.
In each country, there are an innite number of rms that produce consumption goods,
investment goods, or intermediate goods. A consumption (or investment) goods rm produces
its goods using capital, labor and intermediate composite goods. The consumption and
investment goods are country specic and non-tradeable. An intermediate good producer
produces one of a continuum of intermediate goods using capital, labor and intermediate
3I include 140 countries in the quantitative analysis. Alvarez and Lucas (2007a) include 59 countries and
an aggregate representing the rest of the world. Waugh (2010), Mutreja et al. (2014a), and Mutreja et al.
(2014b) include 77, 84, and 88 countries, respectively.
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composite goods. Each intermediate good diers in its cost of production and is distinguished
by the cost parameter  2 Rn. Intermediate goods are internationally tradeable. Intermediate
goods are aggregated into the intermediate composite via a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) function. All the markets are perfectly competitive.
2.1.1 Intermediate composite
Let f() be the density of each variety . An intermediate composite good comprises inter-
mediate goods cit(),
qit =
Z
cit()
 1
 f()d
 
 1
: (1)
Let pmit and pit() denote the price of qit and cit(), respectively, and then the standard
calculations of CES function implies
pmit =
Z
pit()
1 f()d
 1
1 
: (2)
2.1.2 Consumption and investment goods
The consumption (or investment) good cit (xit) is produced from capital, labor and the inter-
mediate composite goods. Let pcit (pxit) denote the price of the consumption (or investment)
goods. Prot maximization problems are
max pcit
 
kcitl
1 
cit
c
q1 ccit| {z }
=cit
 ritkcit   witlcit   pmitqcit; (3)
max pxit
 
kxitl
1 
xit
x
q1 xxit| {z }
=xit
 ritkxit   witlxit   pmitqxit: (4)
2.1.3 Intermediate good
An intermediate good yit() is produced from capital, labor and the intermediate composite
goods. Let ~pit() denote the selling price of the intermediate good yit(). A prot maximiza-
tion problem is
~pit() 
 
it
 
kit()
lit()
1 m qmit()1 m| {z }
=yit()
 ritkit()  witlit()  pmitqmit(); (5)
and it is drawn from an exponential distribution,
f() =
 
nY
i=1
i
!
exp
 
 
nX
i=1
iit
!
: (6)
6
As Eaton and Kortum (2002) explain, i determines the average level of productivity in
country i and thereby controls the absolute advantage, while  determines the variation of
productivity across variety in a country and thus controls the magnitude of comparative
advantage.
2.1.4 Households
The households maximize the life-time utility
1X
t=0
tNi ( ln cit + (1   ) ln(1  lit)) ; (7)
subject to budget constraints,
Nit (pcitcit + (1 + xi)pxitxit) = Nit (witlit + ritkit) + it; (8)
where it is lump-sum transfer of tari revenue, and xi is a country-specic investment wedge
(as used by Hsieh and Klenow (2009)). The role of the investment wedge is explained below.
Capital, Kit = Nikit, accumulates following the standard formula,
Kit+1 = (1  )Kit +Nixit: (9)
2.1.5 Input markets clearing conditions
Capital, labor and intermediate composite are used for various productions,
Ni

kcit + kxit +
Z
kit()f()d

= Kit; (10)
Nit

lcit + lxit +
Z
lit()f()d

= Nitlit; (11)
qcit + qxit +
Z
qmit()f()d = qit: (12)
2.1.6 Steady state
In the steady-state, the intertemporal Euler equation implies that
ri
pxi
=

1

  1 + 

(1 + xi)  Ri; (13)
where Ri is a modied version of the user cost of capital.
The model has two fundamental factors of production: capital and labor. Nevertheless,
the model is Ricardian, not Heckscher-Ohlin, following an insight of Baxter (1992): in a
model with endogenous capital accumulation, intertemporal optimization, and neoclassical
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production function, the steady-state of a dynamic economy of two-country, two-good, and
two-factor (capital and labor) international trade model is described as a Ricardian model.
More specically, in the presence of intertemporal optimization and capital accumulation,
capital-labor ratio is determined by the user costs. Since the user costs depend only on
parameters of the model (, , and xi), the model can be reduced to a one factor (labor)
model as in a Ricardian model.
It then follows that capital-labor ratio in a country depends only on the parameters , ,
and xi. Given large dierence in capital-labor ratio across countries, I include the investment
wedge (xi) to vary across countries. Admittedly, this assumption is not an ideal response
to the Lucas puzzle (Lucas, 1990), but it is a simple way to have variation in the capital-
labor (and hence capital-output) ratio in the steady-state. The question arises whether this
assumption systematically alters the model ?s properties, especially dierences in rich and
poor countries. Given the fact that investment-output ratio measured in domestic prices is
not systematically correlated with income per worker (c.f., Hsieh and Klenow, 2007), capital-
output ratio measured domestically is not systematically correlated with income per worker
(see Figure 1 below). Accordingly, the investment wedge does not play a critical role in the
results.
Another potential problem of the investment wedge is its eect on the labor-leisure choice.
As is true in standard RBC models, the steady-state labor depends on the user cost (see
equation (19) below). A variation in xi can lead to a large variation in labor, which in turn
aects other properties of the model. The model's implications might greatly dier from those
of an exogenous labor model (as common seen in the development accounting literature). I
include labor-leisure decision to check the eects of xi on labor and productivity measures.
2.2 Equilibrium expressions
A key parameter in the model is i > 0. This i controls the mean of the cost distribution
of the intermediate goods. Under autarky, each country produces all the intermediate goods.
Hence, the mean of the distribution, i, is a key parameter to determine country's aggre-
gate productivity. Under an open-economy equilibrium, each country produces some of the
intermediate goods. The mean productivity determines the range of production. Moreover,
if a country has high average productivity, the country can export more goods in exchange
for additional imported intermediate goods. The country then produces even more because
the imported intermediate goods are used to produce other intermediate goods through the
input-output chain.
2.2.1 Autarky
Under autarky, the available variety is  2 [0;1]. All the intermediate inputs are domestically
produced, and the price of intermediate good for a buyer (pi()) equals the seller's price
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(~pi()),
yi() = ci(); (14)
pi() = ~pi(): (15)
Following calculations (see Appendix B), pmi can be expressed as a function of wi. Other
prices are also linear functions of wi. Once prices are calculated, other variables are easily
calculated.
2.2.2 N country model
International trade incurs iceberg trade cost. In particular, one unit of any tradeable good
shipped from j to i results in ij 2 (0; 1] units arriving in i. Similarly, a country can impose
taris. If country j ships to country i, !ij 2 (0; 1] fraction of each dollar arrives as payment
to a seller in j. The tari revenue is transferred to the household in i as a lump-sum. Intra-
country shipment is subject neither to trade costs nor to taris, ii = !ii = 1.
With the possibility of trade, the price that an intermediate composite good producer in
i faces is
pi() = min
j

~pi()
ij!ij

; (16)
and as shown by Eaton and Kortum (2002), the stochastic formulation of productivity helps
calculate this minimum.4
Let Dij denote the fraction of country i's spending for intermediate goods from country
j to the total spending for the intermediate goods. This share, Dij, depends on a vector of
wages w = (w1; ::; wn). The trade balance holdsX
j 6=i
NipmiqiDij!ij| {z }
total value imported
=
X
j 6=i
NjpmjqjDji!ji| {z }
total value exported
: (17)
The equilibrium wage vector w solves a system of equations (Z1(w); :::; Zn(w)) = 0 and
Zi(w) =
1
wi
nX
j=1
NjwjDji(w)!ji
	j   jFj(w)  
NiFi(w)
	i   iFi(w) ; (18)
where 	i and i are terms depending only on parameters (see Appendix B), and Fi = Fi(w) =P
j Dij!ij. This system of equations is completely parallel to an equation (3.18) of Alvarez
and Lucas (2007a) and can be numerically solved.
4In a Ricardian trade model, a country imports goods from the country with the lowest prices. When
 follows the exponential distribution, a minimum of multiple random variables follows another exponential
distribution. Using this stochastic formulation, the minimum price has a closed-form expression.
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Once w is found, other variables are easily calculated. In particular, labor is
li =
 
1 +
1   
 
1
1  
1  Fi + mFi   (x(1  Fi) + mFi) Ri
c (1  Fi) + mFi
! 1
: (19)
Labor depends on !ij and prices of intermediate goods from other countries through Fi, and
also depends on xi through Ri. Similarly, the capital-output ratio in domestic prices is
pxiki
pcici + pxixi
=
1
i

1  Fi + mFi
c(1  Fi) + mFi
Ri

+
(c   x)(1  Fi)
c(1  Fi) + mFi
 1
; (20)
and GDP divided by price of the investment goods is
Ni(pcici + pxixi)
pxi
= constantKi (liNi)1 
i

i
Dii
 (1 x)
m
; (21)
where

i =
1  Fi + mFi + Ri ((c   x)(1  Fi))
c(1  Fi) + mFi : (22)
In this equation, Ni and i are exogenously given, while Ki, li, 
i and Dii are endogenously
determined. Still, this equation is useful because the aggregate production is expressed as a
Cobb-Douglas production function.5
If labor-leisure choice is not considered, then li is constant and common across countries.
When the tari rate is zero for all the pairs (!ij = 1), then 
i = 1 (because Fi =
P
j Dij!ij
and Dij is share,
P
j Dij = 1). Finally, by assuming a perfect substitutability of consumption
and investment goods, pc = px. Under these three assumptions, the measured TFP depends
on (i=Dii)
(1 x)
m , which is obtained by Waugh (2010).6 Further, under autarky, Dii = 1 and
hence the TFP term depends only on i. This means that development accounting correctly
identies the productivity parameter if the country is autarkic. Under the possibility of trade,
the measured TFP includes additional terms: a term directly related to taris (
i), and the
other summarizing trade dependence (Dii).
The question is how large i is. Under autarky, the measured TFP has a one-to-one
relationship to this parameter. However, with the possibility of trade (as in the real world),
i can be calculated only by solving the model.
5The expression is normalized by the investment good price rather than the purchasing-power-parity (PPP).
By appropriately dening PPP in the model, I can obtain an alternative expression, but the expression is not
as simple as (21).
6Mutreja et al. (2014b) also obtain an analogous expression. They have two types of capital goods, but
they do not have labor-leisure choice and taris.
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3 Data, calibration and results
I rst explain the data source and calibration strategy, and then present the results.
3.1 Data and calibration
3.1.1 Data
National accounting data comes from Penn World Table 8.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015).7 Through-
out the paper, I use GDP per worker (employment) as a measure of the income. The obser-
vation year is 2005, but to minimize the eects of business cycles, the values are averages of
2004{2006 values. The number of countries included in my analysis is 140. Availability of
variables limits the countries included.8
Figure 1 shows capital-output ratio against income per worker across countries. Income
per worker is relative to the US, and the scale of the horizontal axis is the logarithm with
base 2. First, as is well known, income per worker greatly diers across countries. Income in
poor countries is less than 1/64th of the US income level. Second, capital-output ratio is not
systematically correlated with income. Based on this fact, I use a simple method, varying the
investment wedge xi, to replicate observed capital-output ratio.
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Figure 1: Capital-output ratio (in domestic prices), 2005
Given that capital-output ratio is not strongly correlated with income per worker, dier-
ences in TFP should play a signicant role in explaining cross-country income dierences.
7Data details are in Appendix A.
8Typically, employment, capital or tari rates are missing. I also drop Guinea-Bissau, which shows an
extremely high capital-output ratio. (It is likely explained by a large reduction in output, which is caused by
a civil war in 2005.) Contrary to Alvarez and Lucas (2007a), I do not include the \rest of the world" as an
additional country. The sum of the 140 countries I include accounts for more than 99% of the real GDP of
all the countries included in PWT in 2005.
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Figure 2 plots conventionally measured TFP using Cobb-Douglas production function with
share parameter  = 0:4 (which is used in my quantitative assessment).9 If TFP perfectly
explains the cross-country income dierences, then the countries are on the 45-degree line
(blue line). Obviously, TFP is strongly correlated with income. The slope (red-dashed line)
is atter than the 45-degree line, that is, TFP explains part of the income dierences.
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Figure 2: Measured TFP relative to the US, 2005
In the model, GDP is normalized by the price of the investment good, rather than PPP.
Figure 3 examines whether GDP in PPP diers drastically from GDP in investment goods
price. The countries are approximately on the 45-degree line. In this sense, using GDP in
investment goods price does not greatly change the implication of development accounting.
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Figure 3: GDP per worker relative to the US (PPP vs investment goods price), 2005
9Precisely, TFPi = (Real GDP per worker)
1 =(capital-output ratio)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3.1.2 Calibration
Table 1 shows the parameter values common across countries. The parameter basically follows
Alvarez and Lucas (2007a,b).
Table 1: Common parameters
Parameter Value Interpretation
 0:4 Capital-share in value-added (VA)
c 0:81 VA share in the consumption goods production
x 0:5 VA share in the investment goods production
m 0:5 VA share in the intermediate goods production
 1:5 Substitution among varieties
 0:15 Technology variation
 0:07 Capital depreciation rate
 1:07 1 Subjective discounting factor
 0:3 Consumption share in the utility
 0:75 Average iceberg trade cost
Alvarez and Lucas (2007a,b) set the share parameters (c, x, and m) based on the value-
added shares in gross output productions. Mutreja et al. (2014b) use slightly higher values
for c while they use lower values for x and m. I conduct sensitivity analysis by changing
parameters.10
The number of workers equals employment in the PWT. In the calibration, this is Ni, not
Ni  li. Hence, my model suggests that development accounting includes the contribution of
endogenous labor choice li, which I analyze later.
Iceberg trade cost relates to distance. The calibration follows the procedure used by
Alvarez and Lucas (2007a) in their additional assessment. First, let distij denote the great-
circle distance between the largest cities of countries i and j, normalized so that the average
distance (excluding distii) is unity.
11 I then set ij = 0 exp( 1(distij   1)). The elasticity
of trade cost with respect to distance is 1 = 0:3. The scale parameter 0 is chosen so that
the average trade cost,  Pni=1Pj 6=i ij=n=(n  1)=2, becomes 0:75. The value equals the
baseline of Alvarez and Lucas (2007a) in which they chose  and 1 based on Anderson and
van Wincoop (2004).12
Tari value is importer specic !ij = !i for all j 6= i, and !i is one minus the most favored
nation (MFN) tari value, excluding a pair of countries with a free trade agreement (FTA).
Tari rate is zero for a country with an FTA (If i and j have an FTA, !ij = 1. If not,
!ij = !i = 1 MFN tari valuei).13 I use the MFN values calculated by the World Bank. As
10In this type of model, the elasticity of substitution across industries  does not play any critical role (see
Alvarez and Lucas, 2007a). The only technical restriction regarding  is 1 + (1  ) > 0.
11The distances are derived from Mayer and Zignago (2011).
12Using this measure, the minimum trade cost occurs between Austria and Slovakia, while the maximum
trade cost occurs between Paraguay and Taiwan.
13Appendix A lists the FTAs included in this paper.
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shown in Figure 4, the tari value is negatively correlated with income. The red-dashed line
shows a regression line. The slope is negative and signicantly dierent from zero.
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Figure 4: Tari values, 2005
Two sets of parameters remain: the investment wedge xi and the productivity parameter
i. They are calibrated to match capital-output ratio (20) and GDP divided by investment
goods price (21). That is, given all the parameters and hypothetical values of fi; xigni=1, the
excess demand function (18) is solved. Next, I calculate variables in the equilibrium. The
search ends when the model and data values of capital-output ratio and GDP/px match.
3.2 Implied productivity
Figure 5 compares the productivity parameter obtained from the development accounting and
a comparable parameter obtained from the model under the open-economy equilibrium.
Productivity parameters are 
(1 x)=m
i , not i. and relative to the US (that is, the US is
normalized to unity). As shown by equation (21), this transformation makes this productivity
parameter exactly comparable to the measured TFP from development accounting.
If international trade does not aect outcomes, then the countries are on the 45-degree
line. Model values are positively correlated with the conventional measure of TFPs, but
countries are not on the 45-degree line. The productivity parameters are smaller under the
open-economy equilibrium.
A simple regression implies that the slope coecient is 0:66, and the intercept is almost
zero. This means that productivity parameters required for replicating observed cross-country
income dierences is about 70% of what is required in the simple development accounting. In
other words, conventional TFP measures overestimate fundamental productivity dierences
by 30%.
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Figure 5: Productivity parameters by development accounting vs model with trade
A regression imposing no interception implies that the slope is 0:59 (\Regression 2" of
row (1) of Table 2). In this case, the implied variation in the productivity is even smaller
than 30%. An alternative measure of the productivity comparison is the ratio of the standard
deviations: the standard deviation of the productivity measure (relative to the US) calculated
from the model divided by that from the development accounting (\SD ratio"). This measure
captures the dierence in variation between two productivities. The ratio is 0:72. Again, the
productivity parameter in the model with trade has smaller variation than what development
accounting indicates. The ratio is also a measure of overestimation, and this measure implies
28% overestimation.
In summary, although the exact magnitude depends on the measurement ranging 28%{
41%, TFP measures of development accounting overestimate fundamental productivity dif-
ferences.
Table 2: Trade barrier variations
Case Regression 1 Regression 2 SD ratio
(1) Baseline y =  0:05
(0:01)
+ 0:66
(0:03)
x y = 0:59
(0:02)
x 0:72
(2) Autarky y =  0:03
(0:01)
+ 1:00
(0:02)
x y = 0:96
(0:01)
x 1:02
(3) Low trade cost,  = 0:825 y =  0:05
(0:01)
+ 0:61
(0:03)
x y = 0:54
(0:02)
x 0:67
(4) High trade cost,  = 0:675 y =  0:06
(0:01)
+ 0:72
(0:03)
x y = 0:64
(0:02)
x 0:78
(5) No tari y =  0:06
(0:01)
+ 0:65
(0:03)
x y = 0:57
(0:02)
x 0:71
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3.2.1 Trade barriers and implied productivity
Table 2 shows the role of trade barriers for the productivity calculations. Row (1) is the
baseline case.
Row (2) shows the case under autarky. There are slight dierences in productivity pa-
rameters obtained by development accounting and by a model under autarky because each
measures labor slightly dierently. For development accounting, labor is measured as the
total number of employed workers (Ni); for the model under autarky, labor is measured as
the total number of employed workers times average hours worked (Nili). As shown by Row
(2), the productivity parameter dierence is small. The contribution of leisure is small, and
the variation in xi does not have a systematic consequence in the accounting.
Rows (3) and (4) examine robustness of the implication with respect to the value of ij.
A 10% lower trade cost (which means high ij by setting  = 0:75  1:1) implies a slightly
larger impact of trade, and a 10% higher trade cost ( = 0:75 0:9) implies a slightly smaller
impact. Nevertheless, the changes in the slope coecients and SD ratio are not large.
For (5), the tari is removed. This assumption is frequently used in the literature, in
particular by Waugh (2010) and Mutreja et al. (2014a,b). The exclusion of tari does not
change the implications. The slope coecients and SD ratio are close to the baseline values.
3.2.2 Parameter variations
Table 3 examines the sensitivity of the quantitative results to parameter changes. Again, Row
(1) is the baseline case.
Rows (2) and (3) change a key parameter of the model, . The parameter  translates i to
the country's productivity, and amplies the eects of comparative advantage. Large  implies
a small dierence in i, which leads to a large dierence in the aggregate productivity. In this
case, even without large dierences in the productivity, the model implies a large dierence
in income across countries. The direct eect of this transmission process is adjusted by
comparing productivity with 
(1 x)=m
i . This adjustment, however, does not adjust any
indirect eects that arise through input-output and international trade chain.
The literature does not perfectly agree on the value of . Eaton and Kortum (2002),
Alvarez and Lucas (2007a), Waugh (2010), and Mutreja et al. (2014b), use 0:12, 0:15, 0:18,
and 0:25, respectively. Row (2),  = 0:1, is a lower bound of these values, while (3),  = 0:3,
is an upper bound. Changes in  are quantitatively important. Under small , the implied
slope coecients and SD ratio are larger than the baseline. The international trade does
little to explain cross-country TFP variations. On contrary, under large , the contribution
of trade becomes large. The magnitude of overestimation is in a range of 10%{70%. Among
the values,  = 0:15 gives fairly conservative numbers.
The remaining rows change the values of production share parameters (c, x, m and ).
As shown by Rows (4) and (5), a change in c does not aect the implications. Under low
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Table 3: Parameter variations
Case Regression 1 Regression 2 SD ratio
(1) Baseline (BL) y =  0:05
(0:01)
+ 0:66
(0:03)
x y = 0:59
(0:02)
x 0:72
(2)  = 0:10 (BL: 0:15) y =  0:04
(0:01)
+ 0:78
(0:03)
x y = 0:72
(0:02)
x 0:82
(3)  = 0:30 (BL: 0:15) y =  0:05
(0:01)
+ 0:40
(0:04)
x y = 0:32
(0:02)
x 0:50
(4) c = 0:70 (BL: 0:81) y =  0:05
(0:01)
+ 0:66
(0:03)
x y = 0:59
(0:02)
x 0:72
(5) c = 0:90 (BL: 0:81) y =  0:05
(0:01)
+ 0:66
(0:03)
x y = 0:59
(0:02)
x 0:72
(6) x = 0:45 (BL: 0:5) y =  0:05
(0:01)
+ 0:63
(0:03)
x y = 0:56
(0:02)
x 0:69
(7) x = 0:55 (BL: 0:5) y =  0:06
(0:01)
+ 0:70
(0:03)
x y = 0:62
(0:02)
x 0:75
(8) m = 0:45 (BL: 0:5) y =  0:05
(0:01)
+ 0:63
(0:03)
x y = 0:56
(0:02)
x 0:70
(9) m = 0:55 (BL: 0:5) y =  0:05
(0:01)
+ 0:69
(0:03)
x y = 0:61
(0:02)
x 0:74
(10)  = 0:35 (BL: 0:4) y =  0:07
(0:01)
+ 0:67
(0:03)
x y = 0:57
(0:02)
x 0:73
(11)  = 0:45 (BL: 0:4) y =  0:04
(0:01)
+ 0:66
(0:03)
x y = 0:60
(0:02)
x 0:71
(c = 0:7) or high (c = 0:9) share parameter, the regression lines are almost identical to
baseline , and the ratio of the standard deviations are also very close to baseline.
The choice of x (Rows (6) and (7)) mildly aects the implications. When x is lower
(higher), the slope is atter (steeper) and the SD ratio is smaller (larger). The eects are,
however, small in absolute value. Rows (8) and (9) show the eects of a change in m. A
higher m implies a atter slope, but the change is small. The last rows, (10) and (11), show
the eects of , and the eect of this parameter is also limited.
Overall, except for , variations in parameter values have limited impacts on the impli-
cations. The quantitative implication depends on . Even for small , the trade shows a
signicant role for productivity calculations. A large  amplies the role of trade. Compared
to the literature, my baseline value yields a conservative result.
3.3 Trade barriers, productivity and income
The eect of trade barriers on income is a subject of long-standing research, and Table
4 presents results through the lens of my model. This table includes only a few selected
countries to highlight the results. Complete tables are provided at the end of the paper
(Table C1).
The calculations are as follows. First, I solve the equilibrium of the model under alter-
native (hypothetical) trade barrier assumptions while xing baseline productivity parameters
fi; xigni=1. Second, I calculate hypothetical utility values for various scenarios. Finally, I
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compare the consumption-equivalent welfare changes of two alternative scenarios, and mea-
sure the eects of various trade barriers on the economic welfare of countries.
Table 4: Eects of trade barriers
Total Sym. Dist- Avg. High Low No
Country Code eect TC ance tari FTA ACR TC TC tari
1 Sao Tome & Principe STP 5.48 6.25 0.93 0.95 1.00 2.20 0.88 1.12 1.06
2 Liberia LBR 5.06 5.55 0.95 0.96 1.00 2.17 0.88 1.12 1.05
3 Gambia, The GMB 4.34 4.78 0.98 0.93 1.00 2.10 0.88 1.12 1.08
...
57 Luxembourg LUX 2.51 2.17 1.17 0.98 1.01 1.79 0.89 1.11 1.01
58 Paraguay PRY 2.49 2.83 0.90 0.94 1.04 1.77 0.88 1.12 1.02
...
127 Mexico MEX 1.36 1.40 0.98 0.96 1.04 1.29 0.90 1.12 1.01
...
130 New Zealand NZL 1.34 1.74 0.78 0.97 1.02 1.27 0.90 1.11 1.01
...
138 Japan JPN 1.12 1.17 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.10 0.96 1.05 1.01
139 Australia AUS 1.09 1.31 0.84 0.99 1.00 1.07 0.97 1.04 1.01
140 United States USA 1.05 1.07 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.04 0.98 1.02 1.00
Mean 2.40 2.51 1.01 0.96 1.00 1.66 0.89 1.11 1.04
Std. 0.89 1.01 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.27 0.02 0.01 0.03
Max 5.48 6.25 1.17 1.03 1.04 2.20 0.98 1.13 1.12
Min 1.05 1.07 0.78 0.89 0.99 1.04 0.87 1.02 0.97
The countries are listed in descending order of the \Total eect." The total eect compares
the consumption-equivalent welfare of the observed income and the consumption-equivalent
welfare under autarky. The value means that for small countries (such as Gambia), the current
consumption is more than four times of the (hypothetical) consumption under autarky. The
value is smallest for the US, but even the US shows gains of 5%.
Arkolakis et al. (2012) provide an alternative formula to calculate gains from trade. They
show that for many trade models, gains from trade can be computed using the import pen-
etration rate and the trade elasticity parameter. In particular, for a model of Eaton and
Kortum (2002), the import penetration rate is 1 Dii, while the trade elasticity is .14 Using
the equilibrium values, the column \ACR" shows the total gains from trade calculated by the
formula of Arkolakis et al. (2012). There are three important dierences \Total eect" and
\ACR." First, \ACR" does not include income change through tari revenue. However, the
experiment below shows that the quantitative eect of tari revenue is small.
Second, and more important, the formula of Arkolakis et al. (2012) is based on the model
of Eaton and Kortum (2002), not Alvarez and Lucas (2007a). The practical dierence is
that Eaton and Kortum (2002) include a nonmanufacturing sector to easily determine the
14The parameter  in Alvarez and Lucas (2007a) is 1= of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Arkolakis et al.
(2012). I follow the notation of Alvarez and Lucas (2007a).
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wage, while Alvarez and Lucas (2007a) (and hence my model) solve the general equilibrium
to determine the wage.
Third, \ACR" does not include leisure, and this assumption also leads to a simple de-
termination of wage. The second and the third dierences reveal that the central dierence
between \Total eect" and \ACR" is whether consideration is given to general equilibrium
eects through wage change (for all countries).
A comparison between \Total eect" and \ACR" shows that the discrepancy is large,
particularly for small countries; changes in the rest of the world dramatically aect wages
in small countries. In contrast, changes in the rest of the world have a relatively smaller
impact on wages in large countries. In any case, both \Total eect" and \ACR" show huge
welfare gains from trade, especially for small developing countries. At the same time, general
equilibrium eects have signicant quantitative impacts on the gains from trade.
The remaining columns, \Sym. TC," \Distance," \Avg. tari," and \FTA," decompose
the total eects into the contribution of trade, geography, taris, and FTAs, respectively.
Column \Sym TC" considers the following situation: tari rates are zero for all the pairs,
and trade costs are set to ij = 0:75 for all i 6= j. I compare the (consumption-equivalent)
welfare under this hypothetically \symmetric" world to the welfare under autarky. Basically,
the values in this column focus on the eects of opening trade after eliminating all the het-
erogeneity in geography and trade policy. The values in \Sym TC" are descending, as seen in
\Total eect." In this sense, simply opening trade is the main instigator of the welfare gains
from trade. However, the discrepancy is large for some countries.
The next column in Table 4, \Distance," examines the eects of introducing distance-based
trade costs. The column compares welfare under the symmetric world and welfare under a
case with distance-based trade costs (as in the baseline) but without taris. The numerator
of the ratio does not consider any geographical features (or taris), but the denominator
explicitly include the eects of distance. Note that, in this model, a country located near
many large, productive countries faces lower trade costs than countries more distant from
these large producers. It follows that the proximate country can produce more than a country
of equal productivity that lacks easy access to productive trade partners. An interpretation
of \Distance" column is the contribution of geographical proximity to productive countries
to income.
The values are large for small European countries such as Luxembourg. Other small
European countries (e.g., Belgium, Czech Republic) enjoy similar benets (see Table C1).
These countries achieve high income partly from their proximity to large and productive
other European countries (as Germany and France). Even for large European countries (e.g.,
Germany, France, the UK), being close to one another increases income by approximately
10%. The value for Canada (1:13) is positive, indicating benet from proximity to the U.S.
In contrast, geographically isolated countries show low values. Among developed countries,
New Zealand (0:78) and Australia (0:84) face the largest limitations to trade with other
19
productive countries. Other Oceanian and countries in south Africa (e.g., Fiji, South Africa,
and Mozambique) suer from location disadvantage (see Table C1).
The next column in Table 4, \Avg. tari," shows the ratio of the welfare under the
distance-based trade cost with no tari assumption to the welfare under the distance-based
trade cost with a country-specic uniform tari assumption.15 This column measures the
eects of average tari rate of a country on welfare. The values for developed countries are
close to unity since average tari rates are very low for developed countries. The eects are not
large for developing countries, as well. Presumably, imposing a high tari, makes dicult for
a country to enjoy production gains by importing productive intermediate goods. However,
many of the trade partners of developing countries are developed countries in which tari rates
are low. Even for a developing country that imposes high taris so that the import price is
disturbed, exporting prices are not greatly disturbed. Moreover, taris directly contribute to
income through tari revenue. Consequently, a high tari rate does not necessarily imply low
welfare. In fact, the Comoros and Djibouti have two of the highest tari rates in the model
(see Figure 4), but the eect of tari is 0:96 for the Comoros and 0:92 Djibouti(see Table
C1). While these eects are larger than average, the largest eect is for 0.89 for Equatorial
Guinea (see Table C1). In addition, imposing a tari sometimes improves the welfare (1:03
for Swaziland). Nevertheless, the eect of tari is, in general, negative (on average  4%),
and the negative eects are prevalent for developing countries that impose high tari rates.
The last column, \FTA," shows the ratio of the welfare under the distance-based trade
cost with country-specic uniform tari assumption (without FTAs) to the welfare under the
distance-based trade cost with FTA-adjusted tari assumption. A country with multiple FTA
partners has easy access to the partners' inputs, resulting in high income.16 This eect turns
out to be small for most of the countries for the several reasons. First, developed countries
already have a tari rate close to zero, so that additional eects from FTAs are minimal.
Second, developing countries usually lack FTA partners, thereby minimizing eects. Notable
exceptions are Mexico and Paraguay. While the average tari is relatively high (11:4) in
Mexico, which is included among high-income countries, it also has many FTA partners. The
negative eect of tari for Mexico (0:96) is almost oset by the positive eect of FTAs (1:04).
In Paraguay, where the tari rate is 9:2, The FTAs (based on Mercosur) provide cheap access
to imports from Brazil and Argentina and increase the welfare.
The last three columns in Table 4 provide additional examinations: increasing the trade
costs by 10% (\High TC"), decreasing trade costs by 10% (\Low TC"), and removing all the
taris (\No tari"). For these columns, the denominator of the comparison is the baseline
welfare. Changes in trade costs almost uniformly translate into changes in the welfare. The
cross-country dierences in the welfare gain are small. However, the US generally experiences
15Note, however, that this model treats tari rates as exogenous parameters and does not include any
endogenous determination of taris. The values in this column do not necessarily capture causal impacts of
taris on income.
16Again, the causal impact may dier.
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the smallest change.
The eects of tari removal are not large in general. This small eect reects the small
impacts of trade policy. For some developing countries, however, the eects are more that
5%.
3.4 Other variables
In this section, I examine other implied values of the model.
3.4.1 Labor
In the standard development accounting, labor is just Ni, number of employed workers in a
country. In my model, eective labor is Nili, which augments the endogenous labor-leisure
choice. As shown in (19), this li depends on xi through Ri and other parameter values.
A question is whether a high xi increases (or decreases) li so as to change the productiv-
ity. Figure 6 examines whether endogenous labor is systematically correlated with income.
Clearly, this is not the case. The endogenous part of labor forms a at line, indicating that
the productivity measure is not systematically contaminated with the endogenous component
of labor.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium labor
3.4.2 Trade-GDP ratio
Figure 7 compares data and model values of imports to GDP ratio. When the model perfectly
replicates the ratio, the countries are on the 45-degree line.
Admittedly, the model does not work perfectly. Since my calibration does not aim to
mimic this import and GDP dimension at all, a perfect match is not expected. Moreover,
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Figure 7: Import to GDP ratio, data and model
(The gure excludes three outliers: Belgium, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The data-based import-
to-GDP ratios in these countries are approximately 1:2, 1:6, and 2:0, respectively, but the model
ratios are approximately 0:4. However, these three countries are included in calculations for the
regression line.)
in this simple framework, it is almost impossible to replicate trade-hub countries like Hong
Kong and Singapore (which, at noted, are outliers and do not appear in Figure 7). However,
the regression line, which is dotted line, has positive slope, so that the direction is correct.
3.4.3 Relative price
Hsieh and Klenow (2007) emphasize that cross-country dierences in relative price between
consumption and investment goods in domestic prices help explain cross-country dierences in
investment rate, and my model provides a simple explanation of the cross-country dierences
in the relative price. Researchers have long recognized the cross-country dierence in the
investment rate, but Hsieh and Klenow (2007) provide new perspectives: (1) investment rate
is positively correlated with income when investment rate is measured in PPP prices but is
not correlated when the rate is measured in national prices; (2) a high domestic relative price
of investment (to GDP price) in poor countries is a key driver to explain this gap; and (3) low
domestic consumption prices in poor countries explain the high price of investment goods in
those same countries. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) then argue that the relative dierence across
sectors in total factor productivity of investment and consumption goods can account for the
relative price dierences.
In my model, the relative price is positively correlated with income driven by (1) the
dierence in the total factor productivity of intermediate goods producing sector, and (2)
the dierence in the share of the use of the intermediate goods in producing investment and
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consumption goods. In particular, under autarky
pci
pxi
= Constant 
(c x)
m
i : (23)
Remember that in the baseline calibration, the production of consumption goods requires
fewer intermediate goods than the production of investment goods does, meaning c > x.
Since productivity i is higher in richer countries, and the power term is positive, pci=pxi is
positively correlated with productivity, and hence income. Under open-economy equilibrium,
this simple formula does not hold, but the analogous eect prevails.
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Figure 8: Relative prices of consumption and investment (data)
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Figure 9: Relative prices of consumption and investment (model vs data)
Figure 8 shows the relative price of consumption and investment goods in PWT8.0 data.
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As summarized by Hsieh and Klenow (2007), who used older data, the relative price is posi-
tively associated with income. Figure 9 shows the model values positively correlate with data
values, thereby explain a part of the variations in data. In the model, the main driver of
the relative price dierence is i, and hence the variations are small. More country-specic
parameters might explain the variations around the upward sloping line. Actually, Mutreja
et al. (2014b) almost perfectly replicate the relationship between the relative price and income,
likely thanks to their more complex model structure and additional parameters. However,
the main point illustrated by these gures is that TFP of intermediate production is an im-
portant determinant of the relative price of investment to consumption goods if the share of
intermediate use diers across sectors.
4 Conclusion
This paper considers the role of international trade to explain cross-country dierences in
TFP. By introducing a multi-country Ricardian international trade structure in the stan-
dard development accounting model, I show that conventional TFP measures overestimate
fundamental productivity dierences by 30%.
I then show that trade plays important role for determining economic welfare. Small
European countries enjoy 10{15% higher welfare through their proximity to large productive
countries, while Oceanian and countries in southern Africa suer from 10{20% lower welfare
due to their remoteness. Moreover, average tari rates and free-trade agreements change
welfare up to 10% for some developing countries. By comparing trade gains with or without
general equilibrium eects, the gains are in general larger for cases with general equilibrium
eects.
My model is silent about the fundamental source of productivity dierence in intermediate
good producing sector. Yet, my result implies that adding this renement to development
accounting can help make the challenging task of explaining TFP dierences less dicult.
However, depending on the trade frictions and production structures, a source of TFP dier-
ences may or may not be amplied. I leave other trade-incorporated development accountings
as a future task.
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A Appendix A: Data
A.1 Data
A.1.1 Data sources
GDP, capital, employment and other basic variables are obtained from Penn World Table 8.0
(Feenstra et al., 2015).
The tari data is obtained from the World Bank.17 The data has many missing obser-
vations, and for maximizing the availability of data, the MFN values are averaged over the
period 2003{2007. If the value is missing for some of the years, I use the average of the values
of the remaining (observable) years.
FTA data is taken from World Trade Organization.18 Among the FTAs eective by
2005, the FTAs covering both goods and services are chosen. The list includes EFTA (3
countries), EU (25 countries), Mercosur (4 countries), NAFTA (3 countries), and follow-
ing bilateral (or one-to-an alliance) FTAs: Jordan{Singapore, India{Singapore, Thailand{
New Zealand, Japan{Mexico, Thailand{Australia, US{Australia, Mexico{Uruguay, Republic
of Korea{Chile, US{Chile, US{Singapore, China{Macao, Singapore{Australia, China{Hong
Kong, Japan{Singapore, US{Jordan, New Zealand{Singapore, Chile{Mexico, Canada{Chile,
Colombia{Mexico, Australia{New Zealand, EFTA{Chile, EFTA{Mexico, EFTA{Singapore,
EU{Mexico, EU{Macedonia, EU{Chile
17http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:
21051044~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
18http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx
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The distance data is basically taken from Mayer and Zignago (2011). I treat Serbia and
Montenegro as dierent countries, but the dataset does not. For calculating the distance
from Montenegro, I rst obtain the GPS code of Podgorica and then calculate the great-circle
distances to other countries using Havesine equation.
A.1.2 List of countries
Albania (ALB), Angola (AGO), Argentina (ARG), Armenia (ARM), Australia (AUS), Aus-
tria (AUT), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bahrain (BHR), Bangladesh (BGD), Belgium (BEL), Benin
(BEN), Bhutan (BTN), Bolivia (BOL), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), Botswana (BWA),
Brazil (BRA), Brunei (BRN), Bulgaria (BGR), Burkina Faso (BFA), Burundi (BDI), Cambo-
dia (KHM), Cameroon (CMR), Canada (CAN), Cape Verde (CPV), Central African Republic
(CAF), Chad (TCD), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Colombia (COL), Comoros (COM), Congo,
Republic of (COG), Cote d'Ivoire (CIV), Croatia (HRV), Cyprus (CYP), Czech Republic
(CZE), Denmark (DNK), Djibouti (DJI), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt (EGY), Equatorial Guinea
(GNQ), Estonia (EST), Ethiopia (ETH), Fiji (FJI), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Gabon
(GAB), Gambia (GMB), Georgia (GEO), Germany (DEU), Ghana (GHA), Greece (GRC),
Guinea (GIN), Hong Kong (HKG), Hungary (HUN), Iceland (ISL), India (IND), Indonesia
(IDN), Iran (IRN), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Jordan (JOR),
Kazakhstan (KAZ), Kenya (KEN), Korea, Republic of (KOR), Kuwait (KWT), Kyrgyzstan
(KGZ), Laos (LAO), Latvia (LVA), Lebanon (LBN), Lesotho (LSO), Liberia (LBR), Lithua-
nia (LTU), Luxembourg (LUX), Macao (MAC), Macedonia (MKD), Madagascar (MDG),
Malawi (MWI), Malaysia (MYS), Maldives (MDV), Mali (MLI), Malta (MLT), Mauritania
(MRT), Mauritius (MUS), Mexico (MEX), Moldova (MDA), Mongolia (MNG), Montenegro
(MNE), Morocco (MAR), Mozambique (MOZ), Namibia (NAM), Nepal (NPL), Netherlands
(NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Norway (NOR), Oman (OMN),
Pakistan (PAK), Paraguay (PRY), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Poland (POL), Portugal
(PRT), Qatar (QAT), Russia (RUS), Rwanda (RWA), Sao Tome and Principe (STP), Saudi
Arabia (SAU), Senegal (SEN), Serbia (SRB), Sierra Leone (SLE), Singapore (SGP), Slovak
Republic (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), South Africa (ZAF), Spain (ESP), Sri Lanka (LKA), Sudan
(SDN), Swaziland (SWZ), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Syria (SYR), Taiwan (TWN),
Tajikistan (TJK), Tanzania (TZA), Thailand (THA), Togo (TGO), Tunisia (TUN), Turkey
(TUR), Uganda (UGA), Ukraine (UKR), United Kingdom (GBR), United States (USA),
Uruguay (URY), Venezuela (VEN), Vietnam (VNM), Yemen (YEM), Zambia (ZMB).
B Appendix B: Computation
See separate appendix.
27
C Appendix C: Eects of trade barriers (full table)
Table C1: Eects of trade barriers (full table)
Total Sym. Dist- Avg. High Low No
Country Code eect TC ance tari FTA ACR TC TC tari
1 Sao Tome & Principe STP 5.48 6.25 0.93 0.95 1.00 2.20 0.88 1.12 1.06
2 Liberia LBR 5.06 5.55 0.95 0.96 1.00 2.17 0.88 1.12 1.05
3 Gambia, The GMB 4.34 4.78 0.98 0.93 1.00 2.10 0.88 1.12 1.08
4 Moldova MDA 4.33 3.93 1.12 0.98 1.00 2.11 0.89 1.11 1.02
5 Central African Rep. CAF 4.26 4.81 0.95 0.94 1.00 2.07 0.88 1.11 1.07
6 Tajikistan TJK 4.18 4.13 1.04 0.97 1.00 2.09 0.88 1.11 1.03
7 Cape Verde CPV 4.14 4.22 0.99 1.00 1.00 2.03 0.88 1.12 1.01
8 Niger NER 3.96 4.07 0.99 0.99 1.00 2.02 0.88 1.12 1.02
9 Kyrgyzstan KGZ 3.90 3.92 1.04 0.96 1.00 2.06 0.88 1.11 1.04
10 Togo TGO 3.89 4.32 0.95 0.95 1.00 2.03 0.88 1.12 1.06
11 Montenegro MNE 3.87 3.52 1.13 0.97 1.00 2.05 0.89 1.11 1.03
12 Bhutan BTN 3.84 3.86 1.01 0.98 1.00 1.96 0.88 1.12 1.02
13 Comoros COM 3.79 4.54 0.87 0.96 1.00 1.93 0.88 1.11 1.04
14 Burundi BDI 3.76 4.51 0.91 0.92 1.00 2.01 0.89 1.11 1.09
15 Djibouti DJI 3.75 4.15 0.98 0.92 1.00 1.94 0.89 1.11 1.08
16 Sierra Leone SLE 3.68 4.08 0.96 0.94 1.00 2.00 0.88 1.12 1.06
17 Lesotho LSO 3.63 4.50 0.83 0.98 1.00 1.99 0.88 1.12 1.03
18 Mongolia MNG 3.60 3.46 1.04 1.00 1.00 1.99 0.88 1.12 1.00
19 Mauritania MRT 3.53 3.68 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.98 0.88 1.12 1.04
20 Armenia ARM 3.46 3.32 1.08 0.97 1.00 1.99 0.89 1.11 1.04
21 Albania ALB 3.45 3.11 1.13 0.99 1.00 1.97 0.89 1.11 1.02
22 Georgia GEO 3.40 3.24 1.08 0.97 1.00 1.97 0.89 1.11 1.03
23 Laos LAO 3.31 3.45 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.96 0.88 1.12 1.05
24 Guinea GIN 3.29 3.64 0.97 0.94 1.00 1.95 0.88 1.12 1.07
25 Burkina Faso BFA 3.25 3.52 0.98 0.94 1.00 1.93 0.88 1.12 1.06
26 Macedonia MKD 3.23 2.91 1.13 0.98 1.01 1.95 0.89 1.11 1.02
27 Mali MLI 3.20 3.50 0.98 0.93 1.00 1.93 0.88 1.12 1.07
28 Malta MLT 3.16 2.90 1.11 0.97 1.01 1.94 0.89 1.11 1.02
29 Rwanda RWA 3.11 3.74 0.92 0.91 1.00 1.91 0.89 1.11 1.10
30 Benin BEN 3.01 3.36 0.96 0.94 1.00 1.88 0.88 1.12 1.06
31 Latvia LVA 2.99 2.68 1.13 0.98 1.01 1.91 0.89 1.11 1.01
32 Estonia EST 2.99 2.70 1.12 0.98 1.01 1.91 0.89 1.11 1.01
33 Senegal SEN 2.96 3.12 0.99 0.96 1.00 1.85 0.88 1.12 1.04
34 Maldives MDV 2.94 3.52 0.93 0.90 1.00 1.85 0.88 1.11 1.12
35 Chad TCD 2.92 3.30 0.98 0.90 1.00 1.87 0.89 1.11 1.11
36 Bosnia & Herzegovina BIH 2.90 2.66 1.14 0.96 1.00 1.87 0.89 1.11 1.04
37 Swaziland SWZ 2.88 3.36 0.83 1.03 1.00 1.80 0.88 1.12 0.97
38 Nepal NPL 2.87 2.99 1.01 0.95 1.00 1.83 0.88 1.11 1.06
39 Malawi MWI 2.82 3.35 0.87 0.97 1.00 1.81 0.88 1.11 1.03
40 Madagascar MDG 2.80 3.51 0.84 0.95 1.00 1.84 0.88 1.11 1.06
41 Iceland ISL 2.80 2.58 1.11 0.98 1.00 1.86 0.88 1.12 1.02
42 Azerbaijan AZE 2.79 2.77 1.07 0.94 1.00 1.84 0.89 1.11 1.06
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Table C1: Eects of trade barriers (full table)
Total Sym. Dist- Avg. High Low No
Country Code eect TC ance tari FTA ACR TC TC tari
43 Mozambique MOZ 2.78 3.61 0.83 0.93 1.00 1.83 0.88 1.12 1.08
44 Cote d'Ivoire CIV 2.76 3.13 0.95 0.93 1.00 1.83 0.88 1.12 1.08
45 Congo, Rep. of COG 2.76 3.36 0.91 0.90 1.00 1.81 0.88 1.11 1.11
46 Ethiopia ETH 2.75 3.07 0.97 0.93 1.00 1.80 0.89 1.11 1.08
47 Lithuania LTU 2.73 2.45 1.13 0.98 1.01 1.85 0.89 1.11 1.01
48 Cambodia KHM 2.73 3.00 0.99 0.92 1.00 1.81 0.88 1.12 1.08
49 Uganda UGA 2.70 3.11 0.93 0.94 1.00 1.82 0.89 1.11 1.07
50 Jordan JOR 2.67 2.49 1.07 1.01 0.99 1.77 0.89 1.11 1.00
51 Zambia ZMB 2.63 3.24 0.86 0.94 1.00 1.78 0.88 1.11 1.06
52 Cyprus CYP 2.61 2.44 1.09 0.98 1.00 1.82 0.89 1.11 1.02
53 Serbia SRB 2.58 2.33 1.14 0.98 1.00 1.78 0.89 1.11 1.03
54 Slovenia SVN 2.53 2.23 1.15 0.98 1.01 1.80 0.89 1.11 1.01
55 Bulgaria BGR 2.53 2.35 1.13 0.96 1.00 1.78 0.89 1.11 1.04
56 Slovak Rep. SVK 2.53 2.23 1.15 0.98 1.01 1.80 0.89 1.11 1.01
57 Luxembourg LUX 2.51 2.17 1.17 0.98 1.01 1.79 0.89 1.11 1.01
58 Paraguay PRY 2.49 2.83 0.90 0.94 1.04 1.77 0.88 1.12 1.02
59 Croatia HRV 2.44 2.18 1.15 0.98 1.00 1.77 0.89 1.11 1.02
60 Ghana GHA 2.42 2.70 0.95 0.94 1.00 1.73 0.88 1.12 1.06
61 Tanzania TZA 2.41 2.89 0.89 0.93 1.00 1.73 0.89 1.11 1.07
62 Ukraine UKR 2.40 2.16 1.12 1.00 1.00 1.72 0.89 1.11 1.00
63 Macao MAC 2.39 2.37 1.03 0.97 1.01 1.76 0.88 1.12 1.02
64 Cameroon CMR 2.38 2.77 0.94 0.91 1.00 1.70 0.89 1.11 1.10
65 Fiji FJI 2.37 3.14 0.79 0.95 1.00 1.72 0.87 1.13 1.05
66 Lebanon LBN 2.34 2.16 1.08 1.01 1.00 1.69 0.89 1.11 0.99
67 Kenya KEN 2.33 2.74 0.92 0.93 1.00 1.70 0.89 1.11 1.08
68 Tunisia TUN 2.28 2.19 1.12 0.94 1.00 1.64 0.89 1.11 1.07
69 Namibia NAM 2.24 2.77 0.85 0.96 1.00 1.69 0.88 1.12 1.05
70 Hungary HUN 2.23 1.98 1.14 0.98 1.01 1.71 0.89 1.11 1.01
71 Equatorial Guinea GNQ 2.21 2.63 0.94 0.89 1.00 1.66 0.89 1.11 1.12
72 Morocco MAR 2.20 2.16 1.09 0.94 1.00 1.63 0.88 1.12 1.07
73 Bolivia BOL 2.20 2.58 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.67 0.88 1.13 1.06
74 Syria SYR 2.19 2.15 1.08 0.95 1.00 1.64 0.89 1.11 1.05
75 Czech Republic CZE 2.16 1.89 1.15 0.98 1.01 1.68 0.89 1.11 1.01
76 Bahrain BHR 2.15 2.12 1.04 0.98 1.00 1.65 0.89 1.11 1.03
77 Mauritius MUS 2.15 2.68 0.83 0.96 1.00 1.66 0.89 1.11 1.04
78 Sudan SDN 2.13 2.39 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.64 0.89 1.11 1.12
79 Gabon GAB 2.11 2.41 0.93 0.94 1.00 1.58 0.89 1.11 1.06
80 Yemen YEM 2.10 2.21 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.63 0.89 1.11 1.05
81 Kazakhstan KAZ 2.09 2.09 1.03 0.96 1.00 1.62 0.89 1.11 1.04
82 Brunei BRN 2.05 2.21 0.96 0.97 1.00 1.63 0.88 1.12 1.04
83 Angola AGO 2.05 2.41 0.89 0.96 1.00 1.61 0.89 1.11 1.05
84 Vietnam VNM 2.02 2.10 1.01 0.95 1.00 1.58 0.88 1.11 1.05
85 Sri Lanka LKA 2.01 2.25 0.94 0.95 1.00 1.59 0.89 1.11 1.06
86 Bangladesh BGD 1.97 2.12 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.55 0.89 1.11 1.08
87 Denmark DNK 1.96 1.73 1.14 0.98 1.01 1.60 0.89 1.11 1.01
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88 Uruguay URY 1.96 2.27 0.87 0.95 1.04 1.58 0.88 1.12 1.01
89 Ireland IRL 1.94 1.72 1.14 0.98 1.01 1.60 0.89 1.11 1.01
90 Finland FIN 1.91 1.74 1.12 0.98 1.01 1.58 0.89 1.11 1.01
91 Portugal PRT 1.89 1.73 1.10 0.98 1.01 1.58 0.89 1.11 1.01
92 Austria AUT 1.87 1.65 1.14 0.98 1.01 1.57 0.89 1.11 1.01
93 Botswana BWA 1.86 2.32 0.84 0.96 1.00 1.53 0.89 1.11 1.05
94 Switzerland CHE 1.84 1.63 1.15 0.99 1.00 1.55 0.89 1.11 1.02
95 Poland POL 1.84 1.64 1.13 0.98 1.01 1.55 0.89 1.11 1.01
96 Ecuador ECU 1.83 2.02 0.95 0.96 1.00 1.50 0.88 1.13 1.04
97 Philippines PHL 1.81 1.88 0.99 0.97 1.00 1.52 0.89 1.12 1.03
98 Belgium BEL 1.80 1.57 1.16 0.98 1.01 1.53 0.89 1.11 1.01
99 Greece GRC 1.80 1.65 1.10 0.98 1.01 1.53 0.89 1.11 1.01
100 Oman OMN 1.80 1.84 1.01 0.96 1.00 1.52 0.89 1.11 1.04
101 Sweden SWE 1.79 1.61 1.12 0.98 1.01 1.53 0.89 1.11 1.01
102 Pakistan PAK 1.77 1.86 1.03 0.93 1.00 1.47 0.89 1.11 1.08
103 Israel ISR 1.77 1.70 1.07 0.97 1.00 1.51 0.89 1.11 1.03
104 Norway NOR 1.77 1.60 1.13 0.98 1.00 1.52 0.89 1.11 1.02
105 Netherlands NLD 1.72 1.51 1.15 0.98 1.01 1.50 0.89 1.11 1.01
106 Egypt EGY 1.71 1.77 1.06 0.91 1.00 1.44 0.89 1.11 1.10
107 Venezuela VEN 1.70 1.79 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.44 0.88 1.13 1.05
108 Nigeria NGA 1.69 1.93 0.95 0.92 1.00 1.44 0.89 1.11 1.09
109 Qatar QAT 1.68 1.69 1.03 0.97 1.00 1.46 0.89 1.11 1.04
110 Colombia COL 1.60 1.73 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.39 0.88 1.12 1.04
111 Turkey TUR 1.60 1.51 1.10 0.98 1.00 1.43 0.90 1.11 1.03
112 Kuwait KWT 1.56 1.55 1.04 0.97 1.00 1.40 0.90 1.10 1.04
113 Peru PER 1.55 1.79 0.90 0.97 1.00 1.36 0.89 1.12 1.04
114 Hong Kong HKG 1.55 1.56 1.01 0.97 1.01 1.41 0.89 1.11 1.02
115 Russia RUS 1.54 1.45 1.08 0.98 1.00 1.35 0.90 1.10 1.02
116 Thailand THA 1.53 1.62 0.98 0.97 1.00 1.35 0.90 1.11 1.04
117 Canada CAN 1.49 1.33 1.13 0.97 1.02 1.37 0.88 1.13 1.00
118 Iran IRN 1.49 1.52 1.05 0.93 1.00 1.30 0.90 1.10 1.07
119 Spain ESP 1.48 1.37 1.10 0.98 1.01 1.37 0.90 1.10 1.01
120 Malaysia MYS 1.45 1.57 0.95 0.97 1.00 1.32 0.90 1.10 1.03
121 Singapore SGP 1.45 1.55 0.94 0.97 1.02 1.35 0.90 1.10 1.01
122 Indonesia IDN 1.43 1.61 0.92 0.97 1.00 1.31 0.91 1.10 1.03
123 France FRA 1.41 1.28 1.11 0.99 1.01 1.32 0.91 1.10 1.01
124 United Kingdom GBR 1.38 1.26 1.11 0.98 1.01 1.30 0.91 1.10 1.01
125 Taiwan TWN 1.37 1.40 1.02 0.97 1.00 1.28 0.91 1.10 1.03
126 Italy ITA 1.37 1.27 1.09 0.99 1.00 1.29 0.91 1.10 1.01
127 Mexico MEX 1.36 1.40 0.98 0.96 1.04 1.29 0.90 1.12 1.01
128 Germany DEU 1.35 1.24 1.10 0.99 1.01 1.28 0.92 1.09 1.01
129 Argentina ARG 1.35 1.57 0.86 0.97 1.02 1.25 0.91 1.10 1.01
130 New Zealand NZL 1.34 1.74 0.78 0.97 1.02 1.27 0.90 1.11 1.01
131 Saudi Arabia SAU 1.34 1.36 1.01 0.97 1.00 1.25 0.92 1.09 1.03
132 Chile CHL 1.33 1.61 0.85 0.96 1.01 1.27 0.91 1.10 1.03
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133 Korea, Republic of KOR 1.32 1.32 1.03 0.97 1.00 1.23 0.91 1.10 1.03
134 India IND 1.29 1.39 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.20 0.92 1.09 1.07
135 China CHN 1.25 1.26 1.01 0.97 1.00 1.18 0.93 1.09 1.03
136 South Africa ZAF 1.20 1.52 0.82 0.97 1.00 1.15 0.94 1.07 1.04
137 Brazil BRA 1.17 1.34 0.89 0.98 1.00 1.12 0.94 1.07 1.02
138 Japan JPN 1.12 1.17 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.10 0.96 1.05 1.01
139 Australia AUS 1.09 1.31 0.84 0.99 1.00 1.07 0.97 1.04 1.01
140 United States USA 1.05 1.07 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.04 0.98 1.02 1.00
Mean 2.40 2.51 1.01 0.96 1.00 1.66 0.89 1.11 1.04
Median 2.22 2.26 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.68 0.89 1.11 1.03
Std. 0.89 1.01 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.27 0.02 0.01 0.03
Max 5.48 6.25 1.17 1.03 1.04 2.20 0.98 1.13 1.12
Min 1.05 1.07 0.78 0.89 0.99 1.04 0.87 1.02 0.97
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